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STUDENT NOTES
of another, when in both forums equal laws are applicable and an
equal administration of justice is obtained.?5
The distinction In the Kentucky statutes relating to venue as
against non-residents and residents is, undoubtedly, a legitimate one,
which works no hardship upon the defendant. It is designed to secure
rights of the injured plaintiff which may otherwise be completely
lost, and the statute should be declared constitutional.
DOROTHY SALONi.

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS IN KENTUCKY
OTHER THAN FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT.
The Kentucky Code provides: "judgment shall be given for the
party whom the pleadings entitle thereto, though there may have
been a verdict against him".1 In view of this rather broad and
general statement, which would seem to include judgment on the
pleadings in any situation In which the pleadings are insufficient, the
paucity of cases in Kentucky relating to motion for judgment on the
pleadings is surprising. In other states this motion is not infrequently
used In practice under the reformed codes of procedure.2 Nevertheless, even in these states it Is not always looked upon with favor by
the courts."
The highest court of Kentucky has indulged in a great deal of
loose language In discussing judgments on the pleadings, so that it
Is difficult to ascertain by a reading of the cases whether the court
is speaking of judgment given on the pleadings on motion therefor,
or peremptory Instructions, demurrers, or judgments notwithstanding
the verdict. However, the propriety of this motion for judgment on
the pleadings would seem to be established by a few cases which,
upon careful perusal, appear to bear upon this point with some
degree of exactitude. The case of Mil er v. Hart4 squarely upholds
a judgment given on such a motion. In this case the defendant had
promised, for a consideration, to let the plaintiff have her life estate
in certain land, and relying on this promise the plaintiff had purchased defendant's grandchildren's reversionary interest in the land.
The defendant then refused to abide by the agreement and the plaintiff brought suit. The defendant answered, denying the allegations
of the petition, and afterwards entered a motion for judgment in her
favor on the pleadings. Her position was that the contract was within
Iowa City Ry. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389 (1895).
1 Kentucky Civil Code (Carroll, 1932), section 386.
2Finley v. Tucson, 7 Ariz. 108, 60 Pac. 872 (1900); Botto v.
Vandament, 67 Cal. 322, 7 Pac. 753 (1885); Steinhauer v. Colmar, 11
Colo. App. 494, 55 Pac. 291 (1898); Grimmett v. Grimmett, 80 Okla.
176, 195 Pac. 133 (1921); Robinson v. Anderson, 88 Okla. 136, 212 Pac.
121 (1922).
8Good v. First National Bank of Roff, 88 Okla. 110, 211 Pac. 1051
(1923); James River Nat. Bank v. Purchase, 9 N. D. 280, 83 N. W. 7
(1900).
4122 Ky. 494, 91 S. W. 698 (1906).
25
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the Statute of Frauds. The court sustained the motion and judgment
was entered. Upon appeal by the plaintiff the decision of the lower
court Was upheld. Unfortunately there was no discussion of the question of the motion for judgment on the pleadings beyond the mere
statement that "as the judgment was entered on the pleadings the
allegations of the petition must be taken as true upon the appeal."
Evidently the court took for granted the validity of the motion. This
decision is doubtless correct, but the question hardly deserves such
cavalier treatment, inasmuch as it has never been discussed in any
case in a manner approaching completeness. Blythe v. Warner' is
another case in which the appellate court squarely upholds the judgment of a lower court given upon a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, but it is no more satisfactory because the motion is referred
to by the appellate court only as a demurrer, and no distinction is
drawn. Other cases are more vague as to the exact point decided,
and are scarcely more informative, but indicate the court would not
retreat from the position it took in the aforementioned cases favorable
to the motion in question. More indicative of the court's position are
several cases in which judgment was rendered on such motion in the
lower court, but reversed on appeal.' These cases were reversed only
on the ground that the motion was not proper in the particular situations arising in the cases, and nothing whatever was said about any
impropriety of the motion in general.
In other jurisdictions the motion for judgment on the pleadings is
of a double nature. It Is like a demurrer' because it attacks the sufficiency of the pleadings, admits the truth of all well pleaded facts in
the pleadings of the opposing party, and may be carried back and
sustained against a prior pleading of the party making the motion,
and because the court will consider the whole record and give judgment for the party who, on the whole, appears entitled to it. It is a
motion because it is an application for an order for judgment. The
Kentucky court has indicated that it looks upon the motion in much
the same light, and has even expressly referred to it as a demurrer.'
It has been said that "the motion, under the circumstances, partook of
the nature of a demurrer, which, if it had been filed and overruled,
5190 Ky. 104, 226 S. W. 669 (1920).
O~ational Surety Co. v. Arteburn, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 281, 62 S. W.
862 (1901); Hall v. Mineral Development Co., 31 Ky. L. Rep. 904, 104
S. W. 341 (1907); Rittenhouse v. Swamp's Administrator, 128 S. W.
(Ky., 1910) 299; First National Bank of Jackson v. Strong, 228 Ky.
604, 15 S. W. (2d) 477 (1929).
7 Clement v. Hughes, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 352, 17 S. W. 285 (1891);
Gatliff v. Johnson, 140 Ky. 282, 130 S. W. 1100 (1910); Coffman v.
Soat, 208 Ky. 591, 271 S. W. 668 (1925); Fergerson v. Rieke, 223 Ky.
321, 2 S. W. (2d) 405 (1927).
'People v. Johnson, 95 Cal. 471, 31 Pac. 611 (1892); Bergerow v.
Parker, 4 Cal. App. 169, 87 Pac. 248 (1906); People v. Brown, 23
Colo. 425, 48 Pac. 661 (1897); Floyd v. Johnson, 17 Mont. 469, 43 Pac.
631 (1896); Burrall v. Moore, 5 Duer 654 (N. Y., 1856); Good v. First
National Bank of Ro, 88 Okla. 110, 211 Pac. 1051 (1923).
' See Blythe v. Warner, 190 Ky. 104, 108 (1920), supra, n. 5.
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would not have prevented the appellees from presenting their proof."'
A slight doubt is thrown upon this point by an earlier caseU in which
the ruling of the lower court sustaining the motion on the ground that
the answer presented no defense, was reversed with the statement that
"If the answer did not constitute a defense, or was not sufficiently
definite, these questions could have been raised by demurrer or by
proper motion". This statement indicates hostility to the motion, and
particularly to its use as a substitute for a demurrer, but it is submitted that this opinion is not controlling because the case was really
decided on the ground that the answer had in fact presented a defense.
The similarity of the motion for judgment on the pleadings and the
demurrer is further Indicated in those cases in which the lower court
has overruled a demurrer to a pleading, and then later granted judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the pleading demurred to
was, after all, insufficient. It has been said that the court should not
create in a party's mind the belief that his pleading is sufficient by
overruling a demurrer to it, and then, without affording him an opportunity to amend, allow submission of the cause upon the motion of
the adverse party, and render a final judgment against him because
the pleading which the court has just said was sufficient, is in fact
defective.1 But it appears that to save himself from a final judgment
in such case the party moved against must file a sufficient pleading,
because the motion calls the sufficiency of the pleading directly into
question, and directs his attention to it.?
In other jurisdictions the motion for judgment on the pleadings
has been found to be useful in situations where the complaint fails
14
to state a cause of action or the counterclaim is clearly insufficient,
particularly where the pleading is not susceptible of amendment,m
and where the answer or reply admits or leaves undenied all the
material facts stated in the pleading of the opposing party and sets
16
up no new matter which is a defense. The cases indicate that Kentueky would hold the same way, allowing the motion both where the
1
complaint or counterclaim is insufficient, t and where the answer or
Ferguson v. Rieke, 223 Ky. 321, 2 S. W. (2d) 405 (1927).
n Harthill v. Cooke's Executor, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1524, 43 S. W. 705
(1897).
12 Ashbrook v. Roberts, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 317 (1884); Bond v. Logan,
Assignee, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 3 (1900).
"National Surety Co. v. Arteburn, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 281 (1901).
2,Powers v. Badger Lumber Co., 75 Kan. 687, 90 Pac. 254 (1907);
Miller v. Waldoborough Packing Co., 88 Me. 605, 34 Atl. 527 (1896);
Tooker v. Arnoux, 76 N. Y. 397 (1897); St. Louis and S. F. R. Co. v.
Phillips, 17 Okla. 264, 87 Pac. 470 (1906).
3 Good v. First National Bank of Roff, 88 Oka. 110, 211 Pac. 1051
(1923).
"Goldwater v. Bowmen, 7 Ariz. 200, 62 Pac. 691 (1900); Schoonover v. Blrnbaum, 148 Cal. 548, 83 Pac. 999 (1906); State v. Votaw,
13 Mont. 403, 34 Pac. 315 (1893); Cobb v. Win. Kenefick Co., 23 Okla.
440, 100 Pac. 545 (1909).
ITMiller v. Hart, 122 Ky. 494, 91 S. W. 698 (1906); Hall v. Mineral
Development Co., 31 Ky. L. Rep. 904 (1907); Marler v. Greenburg
Iron Co., 216 Ky. 682 (1926).
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reply admits or leaves undenied all material facts stated in the opposing party's pleading.9 But the pleading must be clearly bad in order
to justify a judgment in favor of the other party." In case of an
answer in which the affirmative averments are nothing more than
another manner of making a denial, the court will refuse to sustain
a motion for judgment.?
The right to move for judgment is not waived merely by answering the frivolous or defective pleading. = That this is true In Kentucky is shown by the case of Miller v. Hart, previously discussed. The
propriety of the use of this motion at any time from the filing'of the
pleadings until after the trial has started Is one of its chief advantages.
The exact point at which the right to make this motion is waived
has not been determined, and probably the trial court would be allowed
to use some discretion in fixing it according to the peculiar circumstances of the case, but it appears that in other jurisdictions if the
parties introduce evidence as though an issue were properly raised,
it is then too late to ask for a judgment for want of a reply.? There
is practically nothing to indicate Kentucky's stand on this point. In
one case the trial court was held to have erred in granting a judgment on the pleadings on motion therefor, because the issue was
really made up by the pleadings, the jury empaneled and sworn, and
the case stated. But the controlling factor was the fact that the
issue had been, in fact, made up by the pleadings. Since Kentucky
has not differed from other states upon the whole question of motion
for judgment on the pleadings, it is probable there would be no difference upon this particular point, and therefore no waiver at least until
the case had gone to trial and some evidence had been introduced.
Where a party does fail to move for a judgment on the pleadings,
an objection on the ground of absence of reply is waived where the
motion for new trial is not put upon any grounds of defect in the
pleadings. 4
In conclusion it is submitted that the motion for judgment on
the pleadings is allowable in Kentucky; that it may be used to object
to the sufficiency or lack of a pleading of the opposing party; that it
partakes of the nature both of a demurrer and of a motion; and that
it may be used at least until the case has gone to trial and the
parties have commenced introducing evidence.
Jo McCOWN FEsOUSON
2Hadden v. Mannin, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 652, 21 S. W. 38 (1893);
Harris v. Doughitt, 141 Ky. 645, 133 S. W. 550 (1911); Morrison v.
West Point, 201 Ky. 380, 256 S. W. 1102 (1923); Wright v. Wheat,
224 Ky. 386, 6 S. W. (2d) 458 (1928).
"Clement v. Hughes, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 352, 17 S. W. 285 (1891);
Gatliff v. Johnson, 140 Ky. 282, 130 S. W. 1100 (1910).
2Phillips v. Ratliff, 134 Ky. 704, 121 S. W. 460 (1909).
= Soper v. St. Regis Paper Co., 78 X. Y. Supp. 782 (1902).
= Covel v. Smith, 68 Miss. 296, 8 So. 850 (1891).
ssHarthill v. Cooke's Executor, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1524, 43 S. W. 705

(1897).
(9Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. Copas, 95 Ky. 460, 26
S. W. 179 (1894).

